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Why do some faces appear more similar than others? Beyond structural factors, we spec-
ulate that similarity is governed by the organization of faces located in a multi-dimensional
face space. To test this hypothesis, we morphed a typical face with an atypical face. If
similarity judgments are guided purely by their physical properties, the morph should be
perceived to be equally similar to its typical parent as its atypical parent. However, contrary
to the structural prediction, our results showed that the morph face was perceived to be
more similar to the atypical face than the typical face. Our empirical studies show that
the atypicality bias is not limited to faces, but extends to other object categories (birds)
whose members share common shape properties. We also demonstrate atypicality bias
is malleable and can change subject to category learning and experience. Collectively, the
empirical evidence indicates that perceptions of face and object similarity are affected by
the distribution of stimuli in a face or object space. In this framework, atypical stimuli are
located in a sparser region of the space where there is less competition for recognition
and therefore, these representations capture a broader range of inputs. In contrast, typical
stimuli are located in a denser region of category space where there is increased competi-
tion for recognition and hence, these representation draw a more restricted range of face
inputs. These results suggest that the perceived likeness of an object is inﬂuenced by the
organization of surrounding exemplars in the category space.
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INTRODUCTION
In Figure 1, we see the faces of two well known actors (Robert
Downey Jr. and George Clooney) and the morph face created by
averaging the two parent images together. Themorph face presents
a curious puzzle: although the morph “child” face receives equal
contributions from its celebrity parents, it bears a stronger like-
ness to one parent than to the other. In this example, most people
would agree that the morph face looks more like Robert Downey
Jr. If the image is a 50/50 morph of George Clooney and Robert
Downey Jr., what are the factors that drive perceptions toward one
interpretation of morph face toward one parent image over the
other?
In this paper, we propose that perceptions of the averaged
morph can be affected by the distinctiveness of its parents.
According to the atypicality bias account, when pitted against
one another, the atypical parent will exert more inﬂuence on
the morphed image than the typical parent. In our frame-
work, we conceptualize face representations as attractor ﬁelds
that compete for activation of the face input. Activation of a
face representation is determined by the degree of ﬁt between
the face stimulus and face representation. We hypothesize that
due to their location in face space, atypical faces have broader
attractor ﬁelds than typical faces. In this paper, we examine
the atypicality bias generalizes to other categories besides faces.
Finally, we also explore the learning trajectory of the atypicality
bias and investigate how our perceptions of what’s typical and
what’s atypical change as function of learning and category
experience.
FACES IN EUCLIDEAN FACE SPACE
By the time most people reach adulthood, they are able to rec-
ognize upwards of thousands if not tens of thousands of faces.
A critical question is how are face representations organized in
memory to support recognition that is fast, effortless, and rela-
tively error-free. It has been proposed that faces are organized in a
hyper-dimensional,Euclidean coordinate system,or“face space”as
deﬁned by the perceptual dimensions of the face stimulus (Valen-
tine, 1991). The precise dimensions of face space are not explicitly
speciﬁed, but presumably correspond to the physical properties of
the face, such as the length and width of the face contour, size, and
shape of its eyes, nose, and mouth features, etc. Faces that share
similar values on a given dimension are clustered closer together
and faces with disparate values farther apart. A particular face is
localized at a speciﬁc coordinate location in face space based on its
dimensional values. Although conceptually separable, face dimen-
sions are assumed to be perceptually integrated (Garner, 1974)
or holistic (Tanaka and Farah, 2003), such that it is difﬁcult to
attend to one dimension (e.g., distance between the eyes) without
attending to the other dimensions (e.g., shape of the eyes, spacing
between the nose and mouth).
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FIGURE 1 | Images of movie actors Robert Downey Jr. (far left photo) and George Clooney (far right photo) and their 75%/25% (left middle), 50% /50%
(middle) and 25%/75% (right middle) morph images.
At the origin of face space lies the prototypical face that rep-
resents the mean values along these dimensions. Evidence for
prototype abstraction comes from empirical studies showing that
participants aremore likely to falsely recognize anever-before-seen
prototype dot pattern (Posner and Keele, 1968) or face (Cabeza
et al., 1999) than a previously studied pattern or face. Face typical-
ity varies as a function of distance from the origin of the space. In
this coordinate system, typical or average looking faces are located
near the prototypical face at the center and less typical or more
unusual looking faces are located in more peripheral regions A
critical assumption of the face space model is that face represen-
tations are normally distributed such that there is a higher density
of typical face exemplars at the origin and a decreasing propor-
tion of atypical face exemplars with increasing distance from the
origin. Consequently, typical faces are assumed to be less distinc-
tive in memory due to heightened competition from neighboring
typical face representations. In contrast, atypical faces have fewer
neighbors, are exposed to less competition, and are therefore more
distinctive.
The empirical results are consistent with the face space account
of distinctiveness. For example, Bartlett et al. (1984) and Going
and Read (1974) demonstrated that highly distinctive faces are
recognized more accurately than faces rated low in distinctive-
ness. Whereas atypical faces are faster to recognize due to their
distinctiveness, they are slower to be categorized as “faces” due
to their deviation from the face category prototype (Johnston
and Ellis, 1995). The atypicality face advantage has been demon-
strated for the recognition of newly familiarized faces (Light et al.,
1979; Bartlett et al., 1984;Vokey and Read, 1992) and famous faces
(Valentine and Bruce, 1986). Rhodes et al. (1997) showed that face
caricatures, in which the features of a face are exaggerated relative
to the average face prototype, are recognized more readily than
anti-caricatures, in which distinctive features of a face are dimin-
ished relative to the prototype. This view is consistent with Lewis’
(2004) Face-Space-R model, where the recognition of a speciﬁc
face is determined by the number and proximity of neighboring
face exemplars in the space. In summary, the collective evidence
supports the predictions of the face space model where the clus-
tering of representations in face space renders typical faces less
memorable and atypical faces more memorable in recognition.
The face space concept has been explored in aftereffects par-
adigms where prolonged exposure to an adapting face stimulus
causes a systematic bias in the perception of a subsequent test face
(for a recent review, seeWebster andMacLeod,2011). For example,
adapting to a contracted face causes a normal face to appear
expanded (Webster and MacLin, 1999), an Asian face to appear
more Caucasian (Webster et al., 2004) and a male face to appear
more female (Rhodes et al., 2004; Webster et al., 2004). Identity-
speciﬁc aftereffects have been demonstrated in which exposure to
an individual face enhances recognition of the face lying directly
opposite to adapting face in face space (i.e., its anti-face; Leopold
et al., 2001). For instance, adapting to a face with a narrow eyes
and a small, pointed chin (e.g., Fred) will enhance the perception
of a face with broad eyes and a large rounded chin (e.g., anti-
Fred). To account for face-speciﬁc adaptation effects, it has been
proposed the faces lie on the trajectory deﬁned by individual face,
the prototypical face, and the “anti-faces” on opposite side of face
space and this family of faces is systematically affected by the adap-
tation manipulation, such that adapting to anti-Fred renders the
prototypical face to appear more like Fred. Critically, adaptation
effects do not generalize to other faces that are proximal to the
target face in face space, but are located off the trajectory (Leopold
et al., 2001; Rhodes and Jeffery, 2006). Collectively, results from
face aftereffects studies provide compelling evidence that faces are
stored in a multi-dimensional face space with the prototypical face
lying at its origin.
A second prediction of the face space model is that the similar-
ity of a face stimulus is a linear function of its distance in Euclidean
space (Shepard, 1964). That is, the closer a face input is to a stored
face representation, the more likely it is to be identiﬁed with that
face. Face morphs provide a good test of the Euclidean predic-
tion. In the morphing process, two faces are graphically averaged
to produce a “child” morph face. The physical face morph varies
as a function of the relative contributions of the parent images.
For example, an 80/20 morph that receives an 80% contribution
from Parent A and 20% contribution from Parent B will lie closer
to Parent A than Parent B in face space and should therefore bear
a stronger resemblance to the Parent A image. The 50/50 morph
face (i.e., a morph face that receives equal contribution from both
parent faces) presents an interesting test of recognition because it
lies an equal distance from both parent faces and, therefore, should
be perceived as equally similar to both parents. As discussed in the
next section, although the Euclidean predictions of similarity are
straightforward, the empirical evidence suggests that the nearest
neighbor is not the only factor that determines how similar (or
different) two faces appear.
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FACES AND THE ATYPICALITY BIAS
Tanaka et al. (1998) used a delayed match-to-sample task to test
the assumption of the attractor ﬁeld model that distinctive cate-
gorymembers possess larger attractor ﬁelds than typicalmembers.
Tanaka et al. (1998) identiﬁed a set of eight typical and eight
distinctive faces through pilot testing and morphed each typical
face with each distinctive face of the same gender (Figure 2). To
construct a morph of the atypical and typical parent faces, corre-
sponding control points were identiﬁed on the two parent images
(e.g., the corner of the left eye on Parent Face Image 1 and Parent
Face Image 2). The number of control points for facial features
were kept constant, with 12 points on the mouth, 7 points on each
eye, 6 points on the nose, 5 points on each eyebrow, and 22 points
for the outline of the face. According to the level of morphing,
new control points for the morph face were deﬁned by moving the
speciﬁed distance along the vector connecting the control points
in parent images. The locations of intervening pixels were linearly
interpolated across the surface based on the position of the nearest
control point (Wolberg, 1990). A fade process was then employed
in which the brightness values for each corresponding pixel were
weighted according to the contribution of each parent image.
This procedure yielded eightsmorphs, each containing an equal
physical contribution from its two “parents” (one typical, one dis-
tinctive). The Tanaka et al. (1998) paradigm tested whether the
morph face would be judged more similar to the atypical parent,
as would be predicted by the attractor ﬁeld model. On each trial, a
pair of parent faces was presented on opposing sides of the com-
puter screen for 2.5 s. The parents were replaced with the morph
of the pair for 1 s, after which the morph disappeared, and par-
ticipants indicated whether it more closely resembled the parent
FIGURE 2 | Examples of the atypical and typical female and male faces
and their 50/50 morph faces used in theTanaka et al. (1998) study.
presented on the right or the parent presented on the left. The
measure of interest was the percentage of trials on which the atyp-
ical parent was chosen. In the most straightforward version of the
task (Tanaka et al., 1998, Experiment 1), participants indicated
that the atypical parent was more similar to the morph on 60% of
trials, signiﬁcantly greater than the 50% (chance) level that would
be expected if the morph appeared equally similar to the typical
and atypical parents.
Was the atypical parent chosen more often than the typical
parent because it was perceived to be more similar to the morph
or simply because it was more memorable than the typical par-
ent? To address this question, Tanaka et al., 1998, Experiment 2)
added an “unrelated” condition in which two parent stimuli were
followed by the morph of a different set of parents. When par-
ticipants viewed related morphs, they selected the atypical parent
on 63% of trials, replicating the atypicality bias. When viewing
unrelated morphs, however, they chose the typical parent on 60%
of trials. This result suggested that the atypicality bias observed
in Experiment 1 and the related condition of Experiment 2 were
not due to preferential choosing of the more memorable parent;
if memorability alone drove responses, an atypicality bias would
be expected in the unrelated condition as well. Instead, a typicality
bias was observed, a sensible result given that a randomly selected
morph is likely to be more similar to a typical face than an atypi-
cal face. Experiment 3 demonstrated an atypicality bias when the
morph and parents were presented simultaneously, providing fur-
ther evidence that the phenomenon is perceptually driven rather
than memory-driven.
A second goal of Experiment 3 was to examine the perceptual
locus of the atypicality bias. Given that typical faces are assumed to
be recognized on the basis of conﬁgural properties while atypical
faces are often perceived as such based on a particular distinc-
tive feature, inversion provides a means of measuring the relative
contributions of each type of processing to the atypicality bias.
Because inversion is thought to disrupt conﬁgural more than fea-
tural processing, the atypicality bias should be attenuated with
inverted stimuli to the extent that conﬁgural processing under-
lies the effect. Tanaka et al. (1998) added test blocks in which
the stimuli were inverted and observed an atypicality bias that
was signiﬁcant (55%) but diminished relative to the magnitude of
the effect for upright faces (62%). Tanaka et al. (1998) concluded
that both conﬁgural and featural processing play a role in the
perception that the morph is more similar to the atypical parent.
In the attractor ﬁeld model, the attractor basin surrounding
each stimulus is demarcated by a boundary signifying a point in
similarity space at which a stimulus input will activate either of
two representations with equal probability. The disparity in the
similarities of the morph to its typical and atypical parents sug-
gests that the boundary between the parents is not located at their
midpoint. Where, then, does the boundary or point of subjective
equality (PSE) between a typical and an atypical exemplar lie?
Tanaka et al., 1998, Experiment 4) explored this issue by creating
morphs with unequal contributions from the typical and atypi-
cal parent (e.g., 55% typical, 45% atypical, 60/40%, 65/35%; see
Figure 3). The combination at which a morph is judged equally
similar to the typical and atypical parent provides an indication of
the relative distance of the attractor boundary from each parent.
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FIGURE 3 | Example of the continuum of morph faces produced by image averaging a typical and atypical face pair. Morph faces in the continuum were
produced in 5% intervals ranging from 35% contribution from the atypical (typical) parent to 65%.
Interpolating from the atypicality bias observed in the various
morph combination conditions, Tanaka et al. (1998) concluded
that a morph containing a 63% contribution from its typical par-
ent and a 37% contribution from its atypical parent is the PSE
where the morph is perceived to bear equal resemblance to both
parents. This outcome suggests a boundary at roughly two-thirds
of the distance between the atypical and the typical parent for the
face stimuli used by Tanaka and colleagues.
Tanaka and Corneille (2007) tested a simple yet important pre-
diction of the attractor ﬁeld model: if a morph is considered more
similar to its atypical parent than its typical parent, it should be
more difﬁcult to discriminate from its atypical parent than its typ-
ical parent. Because 50/50 morphs are highly distinct from both
parents and can be identiﬁed as such with near-ceiling accuracy,
the comparisons of interest concerned morphs with unequal con-
tributions. For example, a 70%atypical, 30% typicalmorph should
be more difﬁcult to discriminate from its atypical parent than a
30% atypical, 70% typical morph should be to discriminate from
its typical parent. This prediction falls out of the assumption that
atypical exemplars possess the largest attractor ﬁelds: the prob-
ability that a morph positioned some distance from its atypical
parent will fall within the large ﬁeld of that atypical parent is
greater than the probability that a morph positioned the same dis-
tance from its typical parent will fall within that typical parent’s
smaller ﬁeld.
Tanaka and Corneille, 2007, Experiment 1 tested this predic-
tion with a sequential same-different task in which a parent face
was presented for 2 s, a blank screen appeared for 1 s, and the same
parent (“same” trials) or a morph with 50, 60, 70, or 80% contri-
bution from that parent (“different” trials) was presented for 1 s.
Participants judged whether the second face was the same as or
different than the ﬁrst. Consistent with the attractor ﬁeld model
hypothesis, participants were more accurate in saying “different”
when typical parents were paired with 60, 70, and 80% typical
morphs than when atypical parents were paired with 60, 70, and
80% atypical morphs. A simultaneous version of the task (Tanaka
and Corneille, 2007, Experiment 2) produced similar results.
NON-EUCLIDEAN FACE SPACE AND KRUMHANSL’S
DISTANCE-DENSITY HYPOTHESIS
The foregoing results (Tanaka et al., 1998; Tanaka and Corneille,
2007) emphasize an important distinction between physical sim-
ilarity and psychological similarity in face perception. Faces that
are physically equivalent to each other as measured by their
Euclidean distance in face space are not necessarily perceived as
psychologically equivalent. In our work, we found that the atyp-
ical face, located in a sparser region of face space with fewer and
more distant neighbors, exerts more inﬂuence on the morph than
the typical face situated in a densely populated region with many
close-by neighbors. The main message of the atypicality ﬁndings
is that the surrounding category context in which the faces are
found contributes to their perceived similarity.
Krumhansl’s (1978) distance-density hypothesis provides a
parsimonious account of how perceived similarity is affected
by physical and category factors. In her approach, similarity
is determined by two components: (1) the inter-point distance
between two exemplars and (2) the spatial density of represen-
tations surrounding the exemplars. As applied to faces and face
space, these independent contributions are conceptualized in the
equation below,
Similarity(face1, face2) = d(face1, face2) + αδ(face1) + βδ(face2)
where the psychological similarity is calculated based on the
Euclidean distance between face1 and face2, d(face1, face2), the
spatial density of exemplars surrounding face1, δ(face1), and face2,
δ(face2), and the relative weights, α and β, assigned to those den-
sities. Density (δ) is calculated as the summed difference between
the target exemplar and all exemplars in the stimulus domain such
that near neighbors will have a larger impact on density than far
neighbors. The distance-density hypothesis predicts that if two
pairs of faces are equivalent to one another in their Euclidean dis-
tance d, the pair located in the sparser, less dense region of the
face space will be perceptually more similar to each other than the
pair situated in a denser region. The morphing evidence conﬁrms
this prediction. Although the 50/50 morph is equidistant from
the atypical and typical face in similarity space, subjects judged
the morph face as bearing a stronger resemblance to the atypical
parent than the typical face.
ATTRACTOR FIELDS, FACE SPACES, AND RECOGNITION
To account for the atypicality bias, we conceptualized face repre-
sentations as attractor ﬁelds (Hopﬁeld, 1992). According to this
scheme, memory representations, such as familiar faces, form sta-
ble points in the face space that carve valleys or basins in its
landscape (Tank and Hopﬁeld, 1987). In recognition, analogous to
a raindrop moving downhill to minimize its gravitational energy,
the to be recognized face stimulus decreases its computational
energy by following the path that leads to the nearest attractor
basin in representational space. Following this approach, the stim-
ulus need not be a perfect ﬁt with its underlying representation,
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only a close enough approximation to fall within the boundaries
of the attractor ﬁeld’s basin. The potential activation of any given
representation will therefore be directly proportional to the size or
span of its attractor ﬁeld (e.g., representations with large attractor
ﬁelds will capture a broader range of stimulus inputs).
The attractor basins of visually similar faces are spatially close
together in face space whereas faces that are distinct are far apart.
The size of the attractor basin determines its inﬂuence on face
space inputs. Face representations with relatively large attractor
ﬁelds exert a broad inﬂuence on face space and have the poten-
tial to capture face inputs possess. Representations with smaller
attractor ﬁelds have a more limited inﬂuence over face inputs. As
shown in Figure 4, the Euclidean relationships between faces are
preserved in the model where the morph face is shown as being
equidistant from its typical and atypical parent faces. However,
the atypicality bias is the result of the broader attractor ﬁeld of
the atypical face whose inﬂuence extends over a greater region of
face space. Thus, a 50/50 morph that is situated between a typical
and atypical parent face is more likely to fall into the basin of the
atypical parent. As mentioned above, the attractor inﬂuence of the
atypical parent extended to about 37/63% boundary in one of our
FIGURE 4 | Diagram of the attractor field model.The atypical and typical
representations of interest are depicted as ﬁlled gray circles. Located in a
sparse sub-region of face space, the atypical face representation has a
larger attractor ﬁeld relative to the smaller attractor ﬁeld of the typical
representation situated in a denser sub-region. The morph vector is
indicated by the dashed line connecting the atypical and typical parent face
representations and morph representations are located along the vector.
The 50/50 morph is located at the midpoint of the vector and is equal in its
physical distance from its atypical and typical parent representations. The
atypicality bias is the result of the 50/50 morph lying closer to attractor
boundary of the atypical representation than the typical representation.
experiments, suggesting a point of so-called subjective equality
where a morph is equally likely to categorized as more similar to
its typical parent or its atypical parent.
ATYPICALITY BIAS FOR NON-FACE OBJECTS
There has been considerable debate as to whether the cognitive
processes and neural substrates for face recognition are speciﬁc
to faces or whether these processes are employed in the recogni-
tion of other expert objects (Kanwisher, 2000; Tarr and Gauthier,
2000).A related question is whether the organization of face repre-
sentations in face space signiﬁcantly differs from the organization
of objects in object space. Structurally, all faces share the same
internal features (i.e., eyes, nose, and mouth) arranged in a similar
spatial conﬁguration (i.e., the eyes are above the nose which is
above the mouth). Therefore, recognition of an individual face
depends on the ﬁne-tuned discrimination of its facial features and
their spatial conﬁguration. If the typicality effect is dependent on
the arrangement of face representations in memory at this subor-
dinate level of visual analysis, it is plausible that atypicality effect
may be exclusive to faces.
Although most objects (e.g., “chair,”“bird,”“car”) are fastest to
be recognized at the basic level of categorization (Rosch et al., 1976;
Grill-Spector and Kanwisher, 2005; Mack et al., 2009), objects are
identiﬁable at the speciﬁc, subordinate level (e.g., “rocking chair,”
“sparrow,” “Volkswagon”) on the basis of their structural prop-
erties. There is sufﬁcient structural variation within an object
category such that some members are regarded as bearing a
stronger resemblance to the prototypical category shape than
other members (Jolicoeur et al., 1984; Murphy and Brownell,
1985). The structural typicality is reﬂected in category responses
where the typical exemplars (e.g., robin, sparrow) are faster to
verify as category members (e.g., bird) than less typical exem-
plars (e.g., penguins, ostriches; Jolicoeur et al., 1984; Murphy and
Brownell, 1985). Hence, the grain of resolution is sufﬁcient to
arrange non-face objects in a similarity space that is equivalent
to faces. Moreover, the organization of object spaces may follow
a similar pattern of distribution as faces where there is a higher
density of typical objects located at the origin of the space and
sparser density of atypical objects at the periphery.
To assess the structure of non-face object spaces, typicality rat-
ings were collected for the car and bird exemplars to determine the
typical and atypical members of these categories. The typical and
atypical exemplars were then morphed together (see Figure 5). A
naive group of participants judged whether the morphed object
more closely resembled the atypical object parent or the typical
object parent. The prediction was that if the typicality effect is
special to faces, participants should be just as likely to judge the
bird or automobile morph more similar to its typical or atypi-
cal parent. On the other hand, if the perception of objects, like
faces, is inﬂuenced by structural typicality, participants should
demonstrate an atypicality bias for the birds and automobiles.
Tanaka and Corneille, 2007, Experiment 3) found a signiﬁcant
atypicality bias for both birds (66%) and cars (58%), extending
the phenomenon to non-face objects. These ﬁndings indicate that
the notion of a similarity space applies to birds and cars (and,
presumably, to many other object classes beyond faces) and sug-
gests that the attractor ﬁeld model is applicable to non-face object
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FIGURE 5 | Examples of birds and car exemplars rated high or low in typicality and their 50/50 morphs used inTanaka and Corneille (2007) study.
classes inwhich a given exemplarmay be placed along a continuum
of typicality.
ACQUISITION OF THE ATYPICALITY BIAS
How do atypical exemplars come to attract a wider range of inputs
than typical exemplars? The dynamic systems approach was intu-
itively appealing to us for several reasons. First, it stresses the
qualities of the time-dependent, ever changing representational
states of the perceptual system that respond spontaneously to the
environmental inputs (Beer, 2000; Spencer and Schöner, 2003).
Second, dynamic systems are also stable in that their behaviors
are consistent and predictable and ﬂexible in that they can accom-
modate and change in response to new learning experiences. This
characterization seems well suited to describe the face recognition
system that is constantly warped and molded to encode and incor-
porate new face memories. Third, dynamics systems preserve the
physical and psychological properties of face space. Kantner and
Tanaka (in press) proposed that the physical structure of items
alone cannot drive the atypicality bias because their distinctiveness
is a function of their physical relationship to other category mem-
bers. Until the category structure is learned, then, there should be
little or no basis for perceiving certain items as less typical than
others.
Kantner and Tanaka tested the hypothesis that the atypicality
bias emerges only after category learning has occurred. Because
natural categories such as those used in previous studies of the
atypicality bias are known to participants from everyday experi-
ence, Kantner and Tanaka created artiﬁcial stimuli called “blobs”
whose category structure could be learned within an experimental
session. Each blob category was formed around a central proto-
type; typical category exemplars were created by making small
deviations on the prototype while atypical members were com-
posed of larger deviations. Each category consisted of four typical
and four atypical exemplars, thus equating frequency across lev-
els of typicality and varying only structural atypicality (in nat-
ural categories, by contrast, frequency, and typicality are often
confounded).
Pilot testing using the preference task described above (e.g.,
Tanaka et al., 1998) established two blob categories eliciting a
statistically negligible level of bias. In order to test the effects
of learning on the atypicality bias, Kantner and Tanaka gave a
preference task before and after participants trained to catego-
rize members of the two categories to criterion (Experiment 1).
Consistent with their hypothesis, participants showed a small,
non-signiﬁcant atypicality bias (52%) before category training
but a signiﬁcant post-training bias (58%) that was consistent in
magnitude with those of experiments using natural categories.
In Experiment 2, Kantner and Tanaka demonstrated that cat-
egory training per se is not necessary to induce an atypicality
bias within an experimental session. They replaced the training
phase in Experiment 1 with a simple pleasantness rating task and
observed similar results: a small, non-signiﬁcant atypicality bias
(53%) before the ratings task and a signiﬁcant atypicality bias
after (nearly 60%). This result suggests that participants do not
need be engaged in an explicit categorization task to apprehend
the normative appearance of members within a category, a ﬁnding
consistent with past research on implicit category learning. Fur-
ther, they suggest that this form of learning is sufﬁcient to produce
an atypicality bias.
A developmental test of the atypicality effect for faces and objects
The ﬁnding that the atypicality bias can be shown to accrue with
experience using artiﬁcial stimuli raises a related hypothesis con-
cerning the developmental trajectory of the bias. Tanaka et al.
(2011) predicted that children who have not gained sufﬁcient
experience with natural categories to possess a fully formed sense
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science June 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 147 | 6
Tanaka et al. Atypicality Bias
of the associated category structure should show a diminished
or non-existent bias in perceiving members of those categories.
Tanaka et al. (2011) tested this hypothesis by presenting faces,
birds, and cars in a preference task to children aged 3–4, 5–6, 7–
8, 9–10, and 11–12 as well as college-aged adults. Surprisingly,
they found a substantial atypicality bias for faces and birds that
was statistically invariant across age groups. Although the bias was
stronger for birds (71%) than for faces (63%), both biases were
evident from the earliest age group tested. An additional unex-
pected ﬁnding concerned the car stimuli, which did not produce
an atypicality bias in any of the age groups. Tanaka et al. (2011)
speculated that their car stimuli (normed in 1997) may not have
conformed to current standards of typicality. The bird and face
results, however, suggested that the mental representation of these
category structures is well established even in very young children.
MODELING ATTRACTOR FIELDS
Can the predictions of the distance-density hypotheses be tested in
a neural network model? In previous simulations, neural networks
have been applied to study caricature recognition (Tanaka and
Simon, 1996) and atypicality effects in face recognition processes
(Burton et al., 1990; Valentine and Ferrara, 1991). Connectionist
implementation has been shown to preserve the Euclidean proper-
ties of face space where structurally similar faces are located closer
together in face space and structurally dissimilar face are farther
apart (Burton et al., 1990; Valentine and Ferrara, 1991; Tanaka
and Simon, 1996; Lewis and Johnston, 1998). In this approach,
the features of a face, such as its outline, internal features, and
spatial conﬁguration are abstractly represented as feature units in
a face vector. The similarity between any two face vectors can be
expressed by the angle of their dot product such that similar faces
will form a relatively small angle and dissimilar faces will have a
relatively large angle.
As a test of the atypicality bias, Tanaka et al. (1998) constructed
a neural model composed of three layers: a 10-unit input layer, a
5-unitmiddle (hidden) layer, and a 4-unit output layer. The typical
vectors were constructed such that they differed from each other
by two feature units (i.e., [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0], [1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 1, 0], [1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0]) whereas the one atypical vector
differed from the typical vectors by six feature units (e.g., [0, 0.5,
0.5, 1, 0, 0.5, 1, 0, 0.5, 1]. By virtue of their vector structures, the
typical vectors are located nearer the origin of face space whereas
the atypical vector is located further away from the origin. In the
simulation, the typical and atypical feature vectors provided the
inputs to the model with each vector associated with a unique unit
at the output. Training continued for 100 epochs. After learning,
morph vectors were created by averaging the values of the atypical
face vector with and the values of the typical feature vectors. For
example, the features of Typical Feature Vector 1 [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1,
0, 1, 0] and Atypical Feature Vector 4 [0, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 0, 0.5, 1, 0, 0.5,
1] were averaged to produce the Morph 1–4 vector of [0.5, 0.25,
0.75, 0.5, 0.5, 0.25, 1, 0, 0.75, 0.5].
The critical test of the atypicality bias was the network’s
response to the morph vector. When the three typical-atypical
morph vectors were presented to the network, stronger activation
was produced in the atypical face output unit than of the typi-
cal face output units. Consistent with the empirical ﬁndings, the
neural network showed a bias for atypical representations over
typical representations. The simulation demonstrates that neural
network recognition is sensitive to distribution of representations
in the similarity space. These ﬁndings provide computational sup-
port for the claim that recognition is determined by the match
between the input and the associated output and the density of
the surrounding representations.
Bartlett and Tanaka (1998) extended the predictions of an
attractor network model using real female face images. In their
simulation, a 1000-dimensional Hopﬁeld network was trained on
32 patterns consisting of Gabor ﬁlter outputs for eight typical
faces and eight atypical faces, and their mirror reversed images.
The network was tested by presenting the image representation of
32 female 50/50 morph faces (16 combinations of 4 typical and 4
atypical faces, plus mirror reversed images). The sustained activity
pattern for each of the morph images was compared to that for its
two parent images. The simulation results showed that the mor-
phed face fell into the basin of attraction for the atypical parent
face six times, whereas it never fell into the basin of attraction for
the typical parent face. The remaining 26 morphed faces settled
to a distinct pattern of sustained activity that differed from both
parents. Of these, 22 were closer to the atypical than typical parent,
two were equidistant, and two were closer to the typical than atyp-
ical parent. Overall, the attractor network would have selected the
atypical parent 87.5% of the time based on Euclidean distance of
the sustained activity patterns to the parent patterns. The attractor
network model with real face images exhibited an atypicality bias
in the sustained activity patterns for the morphed faces.
INFORMATION MAXIMIZATION HYPOTHESIS
Although a several computational models demonstrated an atyp-
icality bias, the most parsimonious account is provided by infor-
mation maximization. This account reduces the model to a simple
goal of optimizing information transfer in sensory coding given
the statistics of face images in the visual environment. The infor-
mation maximization account is compatible with Krumhansl’s
distance-density hypothesis, and generalizes this idea to a com-
putational principle from information theory. Although the back-
propagation model illustrated the general concept that an atyp-
icality bias can emerge from the statistics of the training data,
information maximization is an unsupervised learning strategy
that is a more biologically plausible model of learning in the
brain. Information maximization also provides a more parsimo-
nious account than the attractor network model, which assumes
that coding takes the form of sustained patterns of activity, and
can take many iterations to settle. Moreover in a Hopﬁeld attrac-
tor network, decorrelation is a component of the learning rule
that is necessary in order to encode highly similar patterns (i.e.,
faces) as distinct patterns of sustained activity (Kanter and Som-
polinsky, 1987). Decorrelation is closely related to information
maximization (Bell and Sejnowski, 1997), and hence the atypical-
ity bias that emerged in the attractor network could be related to
the underlying principle of information maximization.
Informationmaximization is a principle from information the-
ory (Shannon, 1948) describing a coding strategy for maximizing
the information transfer capacity of a communication system by
ensuring that all response levels are used with equal frequency.
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More response levels are allocated for high probability ranges of
the input signal, and fewer response levels are allocated for low
probability ranges of the input signal. In a system with limited
dynamic range, information transfer is maximized by matching
the response function to the cumulative probability density of the
input signal.
This concept is illustrated in Figure 6, adapted from Laugh-
lin (1981). The upper curve shows a probability density function
for the magnitude of a stimulus property in the world, such as
contrast level. The lower curve shows the response function that
implements the information maximization strategy. In this exam-
ple the output has 10 response states, corresponding to 10 “just
noticeable differences” (JND) in response. The response function
insures that the interval between each response level encompasses
an equal area under the probability distribution for the stimulus
property, so that each state is used with equal frequency. In the
limit where the states are vanishingly small this response function
corresponds to the cumulative probability function for stimulus
intensities,which is the probability that the stimulus takes on value
x or less. Note that the slope is steep where the probability den-
sity is high, and shallow where the probability density is low. As
a consequence, equal changes in stimulus intensity have different
effects on the response. The slope of the response function is given
by the probability of the stimulus, which can lead to a number of
perceptual effects, all stemming from a basic sensory coding goal
of optimal information transfer.
FIGURE 6 | Illustration of information maximization principle. Adapted
from Laughlin (1981).
Abodyof research in computational neuroscience explores how
information maximization may be central principles in sensory
coding early in the visual system (see Simoncelli and Olshausen,
2001 for a review). For example, Laughlin (1981) showed that
luminance contrast coding in the blowﬂy visual system is consis-
tent with information maximization, where the cumulative prob-
ability density of contrasts in the blowﬂy environment predicted
depolarization of a class of cells.
These principles may be relevant to how we think about per-
ceptual coding in higher visual processes such as face recognition
as well (see Bartlett, 2007 for a review). Perceptual responses, as
revealed by similarity measures and JND, may be inﬂuenced by
information maximization in sensory coding. For example, face
discrimination is superior for same-race than other-race faces
(Walker and Tanaka, 2003), which is consistent with a percep-
tual transfer function that is steeper for face properties in the high
density portion of the distribution in an individual’s perceptual
experience (i.e., same-race faces) than for face properties in the
low-density portion of the distribution (other-race faces). These
concepts are also explored in Webster and MacLeod (2011).
Here we show how the information maximization principle
of optimal perceptual coding would account for face typicality
effects, and in particular the atypicality bias. We begin with the
assumption that typical faces are from high density regions of
the probability distribution for a set of physical characteristics,
and that atypical faces have characteristics with lower proba-
bility on at least some dimensions, as illustrated in Figure 7A.
For example, a particular physical characteristic might be dis-
tance between the eyes. Figure 7B illustrates the shape of the
perceptual response function under the information maximiza-
tion principle. In our example, this response function could be
JND for facial identity as a function of interocular distance.
The typical face is mapped to a region of the response func-
tion that is steep, and the atypical face is mapped to a region
of the response function that is shallow. Due to the shape of
the response function, the physical 50% morph between the typ-
ical and atypical face is projected closer to the atypical parent
in the perceptual response, as shown by the dashed line onto
Y -axis.
FIGURE 7 | Information maximization account of atypicality bias. (A)
Probability density function for typical and atypical faces. (B) Perceptual
response for typical, atypical and the typical-atypical morph faces as
predicted by adaptive transfer function.
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Bartlett andTanaka (1998) tested the assumption that images of
faces rated as typical are from a higher density region of the proba-
bility distribution than images of faces rated as atypical. 62 female
face images were convolved with a set of Gabor ﬁlters,which are an
approximatemodel of the receptive ﬁelds of simple cells in primary
visual cortex (Daugman, 1988). The image graylevels were passed
through a bank of Gabor ﬁlters at four spatial scales (32, 26, 8, and
4 pixels per cycle) and four orientations, sampled at 255 spatial
locations from the original 120 × 120 pixel images. The outputs of
sine and cosine Gabor ﬁlters were squared and summed, and then
the contrast was normalized by dividing by the activity across all
orientations and scales at each spatial location. Such contrast nor-
malization has been described in primary visual cortex (Heeger,
1991). Typical faces were closer to the mean face than atypical
faces, when faces are represented as a bank of Gabor ﬁlter outputs.
The origin of the face space was estimated as the mean across the
set of 62 female faces. There was no signiﬁcant difference in the
distance to themean face for the graylevel images. However, for the
normalized Gabor representation, the typical faces were closer to
the mean face [t (14)= 2.3, p < 0.05]. We also found that both for
the original graylevel images, and for the Gabor representations of
those images, there was indeed a higher density near faces rated
as typical than faces rated as atypical. The mean distance of each
face to its nearest neighbor in face space was compared for the
eight faces rated most typical and the eight faces rated most atyp-
ical. There was a shorter distance to the ﬁrst neighbor of a typical
face than an atypical face for raw graylevel images [t (14)= 2.8,
p < 0.05], and the difference was more pronounced for the nor-
malized Gabor representation [t (14)= 4.3, p < 0.001]. Therefore,
the optimal transfer function predicted by information maximiza-
tion would have a steeper slope near the typical faces than near
atypical faces, supporting the model illustrated in Figure 7B.
The infomax accountmakes an additional prediction.Although
it is well known that faces rated as “atypical” tend to also be easier
to recognize, this model predicts that subjects will be less sensitive
to small perturbations in the physical properties of atypical faces.
This prediction was born out by the same-different discrimination
experiments of Tanaka and Corneille (2007). Sensitivity to small
perturbations in the face created by morphing was signiﬁcantly
lower for atypical than typical faces.
A similar account applies to perceptions of morph between
same-race and other-race faces. A morph stimulus that is half-
way on a physical continuum between a same-race face and an
other-race face is typically perceived as more similar to the other-
race face (Kaping et al., 2002). This effect follows from the model
shown in Figure 7B, if we assume a higher probability density of
physical properties of same-race faces in an individuals percep-
tual experience than for the values these properties take on for
other-race faces. Again, the 50% physical morph is mapped to a
shallow-sloped region of the perceptual response function, and is
closer to the response for other-race faces than same-race faces.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this review, we describe a simple but powerful test of struc-
tural and psychological accounts of perceptual similarity. In our
paradigm, two parent faces – an atypical parent face and typical
parent face – aremorphed together to form a childmorph face that
constitutes the physical average between its parents. The morph
face receives a 50–50 contribution from both parents, and there-
fore, based on its structural (i.e., physical) properties, it should
equally resemble the atypical and typical parent face. However,
contrary to the structural view, participants systematically judge
the morph face as bearing a stronger resemblance to the atypi-
cal parent than the typical parent. The atypicality bias indicate
that perceptual similarity is not solely determined by its structural
inputs, but by psychological factors related to context of those
inputs and the experience of the observer.
We propose that the bias for the atypical parent can be
explained by Krumhansl’s Distance-Density hypothesis in which
the perceived similarity between two faces depends on their phys-
ical resemblance as well as their relative locations in the face
space. According to Distance-Density hypothesis, perception of
the morph stimulus is more heavily weighted toward the atypical
face by virtue of its location in face space. An atypical face resides
in a sparser region of face space where there is less competition for
recognition than typical faces. We propose that atypical faces have
broad attractor ﬁelds that allow them to capture a wider range of
perceptual inputs than typical faces. Further tests of the attrac-
tor ﬁeld hypothesis have shown that the atypical bias does not
reﬂect a memory bias for more atypical, distinctive items (Tanaka
et al., 1998, Experiment 3) but indicates a perceptual insensitiv-
ity to changes in an atypical face relative to changes in a typical
face (Tanaka and Corneille, 2007, Experiment 1). Nor is atypicality
bias “special” to faces, but extends to the perception of non-face
objects, such as birds (Tanaka and Corneille, 2007, Experiment
2) and these “object” spaces are established relative early on in
development (Tanaka et al., 2011).
Although the developmental evidence suggests that the struc-
ture of face space structure is established relatively early on in
development (Nishimura, the category structure for non-face
objects is more malleable and responsive to the effects of per-
ceptual learning. In a recent study, we (Kantner and Tanaka, in
press), created two category prototypes of polygon shapes (i.e.,
blobs) and a family of exemplars for each prototype (Curran et al.,
2002); some blob exemplars were created such that they display
modest variation from the family prototype (typical exemplars)
whereas other blob exemplars showed greater variation (atypical
exemplars). Participants were asked to judge where the morphs of
the typical and atypical exemplars showed a stronger resemblance
to the typical parent or the atypical parent before and after cat-
egory training. Whereas participants did not show a preference
for the atypical exemplar before category learning, they demon-
strated a reliable atypicality bias after category learning (Kantner
and Tanaka, in press). The inﬂuence of typicality bias in perceptual
learning was further validated in several neural network simula-
tions and is a general perceptual principle that can be described
by information maximization theory (Bartlett and Tanaka, 1998;
Bartlett, 2007). After learning atypical and typical inputs, the
neural network simulations showed that atypical-typical morph
inputs elicited a greater response in the atypical output unit than
the typical output units. Collectively, the empirical and simula-
tion results indicate that perceptual similarity is inﬂuenced by the
physical properties, category structure, and learning histories of
the stimuli.
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In this paper, we argue that psychological similarity in object
perception can be dissociated from physical similarity. To support
this claim, we present evidence in which a morphed object that
is physically equivalent to a typical and atypical parent object is
perceived to be more psychologically similar to the atypical object
than the typical object. These results suggest that beyond physi-
cal structure, the perceived likeness of an object is inﬂuenced by
the organization of surrounding exemplars in the category space.
Atypical objects exert more inﬂuence on judgments of perceived
similarity than typical objects. Of course, whether an object is
regarded as typical or atypical is not a priori pre-determined, but
depends on the perceptual experience of the observer Thus, the
atypicality bias exempliﬁes the constant refashioning of our per-
ceptions through learning, and, more broadly, the inﬂuence of
higher order cognitive process on the perceptual apparatus.
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